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Abstract— There is evidence that selective attention 
mechanisms in humans can be impacted in performance 
contexts involving the presence of robotic agents compared to 
contexts in which they are alone. However, the question of 
whether this process is due to anthropomorphism attribution, 
potentially explaining why robots trigger the same effect as 
humans, remains unclear. We investigated this issue using a 
selective attention task in a social presence paradigm. One 
group of participants performed the so-called Eriksen Flanker 
task in the presence of a robot after a verbal social interaction 
(i.e., social robot condition), while the other group did the same 
with a robot that they only described (i.e., non-social robot 
condition). Results showed that after social interaction, the 
robot was perceived as having human traits (according to the 
humanization and anthropomorphism scale). Furthermore, we 
found a social presence effect (i.e., an improvement in selective 
attention performance) only in the presence of the social robot 
but not in that of the non-social one. Finally, this latter effect 
was mediated by anthropomorphism attributions. Our results 
suggest that the influence of robot presence is socio-cognitive in 
nature and that anthropomorphism has a role in the robot 
presence effect. Theoretical implications are further discussed. 
Keywords—Social Robotics, Human-Robot Interaction, 
Selective attention, Anthropomorphism, Eriksen Flanker task, 
Social presence 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Humanoid robots might become increasingly present in 
the lives of millions of people worldwide [1], [2]. While 
tremendous progress has been made in robotics science, the 
influence that these new humanoid robots may have on 
human cognition itself remains poorly understood. There is 
evidence [3]–[6] that the presence of a humanoid robot can 
lead to effects similar to those caused by human presence in 
terms of feelings [7] and task performance [3], [4]. 
However, these pioneering efforts have overlooked both the 
interaction between attentional processes and the 
anthropomorphic inferences that may be involved in the 
influence of robotic presence. Here, we take advantage of 
research on human presence and attention and argue that the 
presence of humanoid robots—even passive—may affect 
attentional processes, at least when the robot present is 
anthropomorphized to some extent. 
A. Brief review of earlier research on social presence and 
social robot presence effects 
A century of research in experimental social psychology 
has shown a tendency for humans to perform differently on 
a myriad of motor and cognitive tasks when in the presence 
of conspecifics—other members of the same species—than 
they do when they are alone. Zajonc [8] was the first to 
notice that the presence of observers or coactors typically 
facilitates performance on easy or well-learned tasks, and 
impairs performance on difficult or poorly-learned tasks. 
Taking this idea further, Baron’s distraction/conflict theory 
suggested an integrative attentional view of this so-called 
Social Facilitation/Inhibition Effect (SFI) [9]. The key idea 
was that social presence, when it is distracting or diverts 
attention away from the focal task, can create attentional 
conflict, namely a form of response conflict concerning the 
appropriate attentional response (pay attention to the focal 
task or to the person present). This conflict, in turn, may 
result in cognitive overload and, ultimately, restrict the 
attentional focus.  
Attentional focusing may produce different effects. 
Firstly, through the activation of dominant responses. In this 
case, the process facilitates performance. Because of the 
smaller amount of cognitive resources available, peripheral 
stimuli are screened out when the task is simple or requires 
attention to be paid to a small number of central cues. 
Secondly, through the impairment of performance (by 
neglecting certain crucial stimuli) when the task is more 
complex or demands attention to a wide range of cues.  
According to the Ethopoeia concept [10], automatic 
social reactions are triggered by situations that include 
social cues, which need not consist solely of other humans 
[11], [12]. This concept also seems to apply to Human-
Robot Interactions (HRI) [3], [5], [7], [10], [13]. For 
example, it has been shown that the modalities of interaction 
might directly impact how humans consider artificial social 
agents in response to one and the same robot [3], [5], [6].  
For instance, a recent study [5] showed that a robot 
acting positively with participants (e.g., with empathy and 
consideration) during a question/answer paradigm produced 
less SFI than a robot acting negatively (e.g., with contempt 
and a lack of empathy). In the presence of a “bad” robot, 
participants tended to improve their selective attention 
performances (i.e., the ability to select the pertinent 
information in a task or a context and to inhibit the non-
relevant information) on the Stroop task (in which 
individuals have to identify the color in which a word is 
printed, while ignoring the word itself). No such 
improvement was observed in the presence of the “good” 
robot.  As has also been found in human-human studies 
[14], [15], the presence of a robot seems, under certain 
circumstances, to improve the selectivity of attention to 
relevant information at the expense of competing cues in 
easy tasks [14]. Indeed, in Spatola et al.’s experiment, the 
bad social robot had the same impact on selective attention 
performance as human presence [14]. The authors suggested 
that this could have been due either to the unexpected 
activation of behavior due to the attribution of 
anthropomorphic traits (i.e., the attribution of human 
characteristics to a non-human) [16] or to the perceived 
evaluative threat associated with the presence of an 
unpleasant robot [17]. However, while Spatola et al.’s study 
was informative, robots designed to live with us are not 
intended to appear threatening. Nevertheless, their impact 
on attentional mechanisms and behavior in general may 
actually depend to a great extent on what people come to 
believe (anthropomorphic inferences) about them. 
Subsequent research has shown that SFI effects may occur 
following a previous social interaction with a robot. This is 
due to the emergence of anthropomorphization processes 
triggered by the situation [6]. Taken together, these findings 
run counter to a purely mechanistic approach that reduces 
the effects of a robot's presence to the action of physical 
visual or acoustic distraction by an object, which may 
sometimes impact human performances (see also [9]), and 
to the role of anthropomorphism. 
However, because of the design used, Spatola et al.’s 
[5], [6] research could not specify the exact role of 
anthropomorphic inferences in the Robot SFI on cognitive 
performance and the nature of the anthropomorphic 
mediator of SFI effects remains unclear. Indeed, 
anthropomorphism is a complex concept that brings together 
various psychological processes such as social 
categorization or the modulation of the conceptual distance 
between humans and robots. Finally, this research indicates 
that the presence of a social robot can boost attentional 
focusing even when this process requires the deployment of 
inhibitory control. However, this conclusion is limited 
solely to the task used in the study in question, namely the 
Stroop task. 
Regarding the incentive to introduce robots in various 
environments such as school [18], it seems of prime 
importance to gain a thorough understanding of the impact 
of robot presence on human cognitive processes. One of the 
basic processes for learning is the selective attention process 
that helps to filter out incidental irrelevant information and 
focus on the information/stimuli that demand attention. 
Here, we intend to compare the SFI-mediating role of two 
major psychosocial mechanisms involved in interpersonal 
perception and behavior in a new attentional control task, 
the Flanker task, which measures selective attention 
performances. We will therefore focus our research on the 
following questions:  
First, will Robot SFI be found in another gold-standard 
task of response inhibition measuring selective attention? 
Second, are SFI effects involving robots due to the use of 
universal social perceptual dimensions that drive social 
categorization (i.e., warmth and competence) by the 
observer [19]. Third, are SFI effects involving robots also 
based on the attribution of concepts that are uniquely 
inherent to humans [20] and thus to a modulation of the 
conceptual distance between the robot and the 
representation of what humans are? Finally, are these 
processes mutually exclusive?  
B. The Flanker task 
To generalize the Robot SFI, we used the Eriksen 
Flanker task (EFT) [21], [22]. The EFT requires participants 
to judge the direction of the central cue in multi-component 
stimuli. The task comprised congruent (e.g. >>>>>) and 
incongruent stimuli (e.g. <<><<) that were used to assess 
the ability to suppress information that is not relevant for the 
task that is to be performed. Response times are usually 
longer on incongruent than on congruent trials because of 
the incompatibility between the peripheral items and the 
central cue (i.e., the target). On incongruent trials, the 
interference caused by contradictory irrelevant information 
requires a supplementary inhibition process, which is not 
present on congruent trials. Thus, the EFT specifically 
makes it possible to measure selective attention 
performance. As in the Stroop task, the response inhibition 
processes involved in the EFT are sensitive to the social 
nature of the context and the presence of other fellow 
creatures [22], [23]. 
C. The perception of social robots 
The “Computers Are Social Actors” theory [24] posits 
that people may understand and relate to machines in a 
similar way that they do to their fellow creatures. Humans 
do indeed tend to apply the same social scripts (specifying 
actions to be produced in various social situations [25] such 
as human-robot or human-human interactions [10]). This 
tendency may be strengthened by the physical presence of 
the artificial agent and its humanoid shape, as this shape 
provides more social cues to the observer [26]–[29]. 
Interestingly, this process may result in two, non-
exclusive, socio-cognitive phenomena, 1) the use of 
universal dimensions of social perception to apply social 
categorizations to artificial agents [30], [31] and 2) the 
change in the intrinsic representation of robots as a 
modulation of the conceptual human-robot distance [6], 
[20]. Both processes are related to how people perceive and 
consider others but also to how they behave in their 
presence [32]–[34].   
1) The use of universal dimensions of social perception 
to characterize artificial agents 
According to Fiske, Cuddy and Glick [19], [35], most 
interpersonal impressions are distributed along two main 
dimensions: warmth (e.g., sincerity, trustworthiness, 
morality) and competence (e.g., ambition, confidence). The 
warmth dimension predicts active behaviors such as helping 
(high warmth) or attacking (low warmth). The competence 
dimension predicts passive behaviors such as association 
(high competence) or neglect (low competence). The model 
is based on the notion that, when interacting with an 
individual, people will assess their intent to either help or 
harm (i.e., warmth dimension) and their 
competence/capacity to act accordingly (i.e., competence 
dimension). The results of this evaluation will trigger a 
social categorization process, which is the process of 
classifying people into groups based on similar 
characteristics. For example, members of social groups 
stereotyped as warm and competent are perceived much 
more positively than members of social groups stereotyped 
as cold and incompetent. Previous  research  indicates  that 
social  categorization  processes underlying  the  perception 
of persons can be generalized  to  robots [31], [36]. Inspired 
by Fiske et al.'s model, Carpinella et al. have proposed a 
questionnaire to assess these dimensions of social evaluation 
with regard to robots [30]. We will therefore use this tool to 
evaluate the scope of the mediating role of the warmth and 
competence dimensions in Robot SFI.  
2) The change in the intrinsic representation of robots 
The theory of dehumanization describes a disposition 
towards others in which the observer deprives the other of 
social or fundamental human characteristics. The 
dehumanization process, theorized by Haslam [20], refers to 
perceiving or treating people as more or less human. This 
process consists of two bi-dimensional negative/positive 
constructs illustrating the human essence: 1) animalistic 
dehumanization opposed to human uniqueness (e.g., 
Amorality / Moral sensibility), which distinguishes humans 
from other animals on typical socially learned 
characteristics; 2) mechanistic dehumanization opposed to 
human nature (e.g., Rigidity / Cognitive openness), which 
represents fundamental characteristics held inherently since 
birth central to human beings and the distance between 
machines and humans. Interestingly, these dimensions echo 
the warmth/competence concepts. However, the 
dehumanization process is based on a modulation of the 
distance between the representation of what defines the 
concept of Human and the representation of the other [34], 
[37], [38], rather than on a stereotyping process [39]. Harris 
and colleagues suggested that dehumanization occurs due to 
the decrease of neural activity towards the target [40]. 
Interestingly, this difference in neural activity is also 
observed in the comparison between Human-Human and 
Human-Robot interactions [41], [42]. This idea is supported 
by fMRI results showing that HRI is underpinned by 
human-human neuro-social mechanisms [42]–[44]. 
Regarding HRI, this process seems to be both bottom-up 
and top-down. First, perception (i.e., a bottom-up process) 
activates a motor resonance process. Motor resonance 
makes it possible to directly and immediately understand an 
action performed by others by providing a motor 
representation of the observed action through which the 
observer's motor system enters a state of direct resonance 
with that of the agent [45]–[47]. In the same way that we 
cannot refrain from recognizing a face or a word when we 
perceive it, we cannot help but represent in motor terms the 
actions we perceive. During interactions with humans, the 
information that leads to this activity is integrated 
completely automatically [48], [49] and is resistant to 
modulation by context [50], [51]. This system could be used 
to anticipate other people's actions [52]. In the case of 
robots, this automatic need to anticipate is still present [53]. 
However, the resonance would naturally be weaker and 
more context-dependent [54]. The reason could lie in the 
fact that it is more difficult to match the representation of a 
specific human action with the actual action of the robot 
than it is to match it with the actual action of another human 
[55]. If the context requires the system to interpret the 
movements of the robot in terms of human characteristics 
then the system could act more forcefully to transform a 
weak bottom-up signal into a valid representation at the 
level of motor resonance by using top-down inferences 
concerning robots (i.e., social scripts, anthropomorphic 
inferences) [53], [56]. Due to these bottom-up/top-down 
processes, robots could trigger the same effect as humans do 
[3], [5] simply by being present and could, for example, 
activate “humanization” processes (i.e., attributing to them 
intentions, emotions or mental states comparable to those of 
humans) [44], [57]–[59]. In other words, the process might 
represent the opposite of dehumanization. Furthermore, 
because in HRI this process is sensitive to contextual 
pressures, one and the same robot will not be considered to 
be the same in different contexts (e.g., social vs. non-social 
context) and will produce different socio-cognitive effects 
[6].  
II. THE PRESENT STUDY 
A. Objective 
In this study, our aim is to evaluate the mediating role on 
SFI of the universal social perceptual dimensions of warmth 
and competence, as well as of the intrinsic representation of 
robots activated, within a social HRI compared to a non-
social HRI. To do so, we used a verbal social interaction 
paradigm with a simple humanoid robot without any facial 
expression in order to control for emotional priming effects. 
Verbal social HRI is thought to increase the likelihood of 
human characteristics being attributed to the robot because 
of the activation of automatic social scripts that we use in 
human-human interactions [10]. This design should 
therefore maximize anthropomorphic inferences in only one 
of two robotic conditions [6]. After the HRI induction, the 
participants performed a selective attention task in the 
passive presence of the robot. 
B. Hypotheses 
First, we hypothesized that after a social HRI, robots 
should trigger the same SFI on selective attention as humans 
do, that is to say an improvement in response inhibition 
performances [3], [5], [14], [15]. Because the inhibition 
process is similar in both the Stroop task and the EFT, we 
hypothesized that in the presence of the social robot, 
participants should produce better performances than in the 
presence of the non-social robot. The presence of the social 
robot should result in the attentional focus being narrowed 
down to the central cue at the expense of the peripheral 
cues, thereby reducing the response conflict [6], [9]. 
Second, we expected to observe an increased level of 
attribution on both the universal dimensions of warmth and 
competence, as well as an increase in the intrinsic 
representation of robots on essential human dimensions. 
More specifically, we expected the robot in the social robot 
condition to be attributed a higher level of warmth due to 
the social nature of the experience, and to be attributed more 
competence due to the more complex HRI in the social 
condition compared to the simple description required in the 
non-social condition. Regarding the intrinsic representation 
of robots, we expected the participants to perceive the robots 
as sharing more human nature traits in the social than in the 
non-social condition. 
Third, the SFI effect in the social condition should be 
mediated by the inferences made about the robot. Indeed, 
according to previous research showing that social 
interaction promotes the attribution of human traits [6], [60], 
we hypothesized that the more highly the participants 
perceived the robot on the universal dimensions of warmth 
and competence used in social categorization, the more  
sensitive they should be to its passive presence, thus 
resulting in a higher SFI. The same phenomenon should 
occur as a function of the level of perceived shared human 
traits.  
Finally, we will conduct an exploratory analysis to 
compare the hypothetical mediation factor of SFI. The 
purpose is to identify the main determinant of this socio-
cognitive phenomenon. 
III. METHOD 
A. Participants 
The participants were 80 French students at Université 
Clermont Auvergne (Mage = 19.32 years, SD = 2.05, 68 
females and 12 males) with normal (or corrected-to-normal) 
vision (27 in the Alone condition, 27 in the Non-Social 
Robot condition, and 26 in the Social Robot condition). 
Sample size was determined—as recommended by 
Tabachnick and Fidell [61]—on the basis of the desired 
power (.80), alpha level (.05), number of groups (three in 
the main analysis), and anticipated effect size based on 
human presence effects (using between-subjects design) in a 
Stroop paradigm (η²p =.40; [23]). Using G*Power 3.1 [62], 
the minimum required sample size was calculated as 66. 
B. Procedure 
The participants performed the Eriksen Flanker task 
twice (Session 1, Session 2). First (Session 1), all the 
participants performed the task alone (the experimenter left 
the room). The first session was used as a control to ensure 
that the different groups performed equally on the Flanker 
task without any experimental induction. It also made it 
possible to ensure that all the participants had comparable 
knowledge and skill with regard to the task. At the end of 
the first session, the participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the three conditions:  
- In the alone condition, they had to describe a picture of 
Central Park. This task was used as a distractor task in order 
to maintain the reliability of group comparisons at the level 
of intersession activities.  
- In the non-social robot condition, they had to describe the 
design of the robot that the experimenter brought into the 
room.  
- Finally, in the social robot condition, they were asked to 
interact verbally with the same robot in (unknown to them) a 
“Wizard of Oz paradigm” [63]. The robot was presented as 
a work in progress. The robot was the same in both the 
social and non-social conditions.  
These two conditions have been previously pretested (see 
[6]). 
The participants were asked whether they agreed to describe 
or to interact with the robot, according to the experimental 
condition. They were told that the purpose of the study was 
to collect their impressions on the robot in order to improve 
it. The tasks took the same amount of time. 
After a break, all the participants performed the Flanker task 
again, either alone (as before) or in the presence of the 
robot. In the two robot presence conditions, the robot was 
positioned in front of the participants and watched them for 
60% of the time (for a similar procedure with human 
presence, see [14], [15]). The interaction always followed 
the same pre-established script (See Supplementary 
materials on OSF) (Figure 1). 
C. Wizard of Oz 
A smartphone with a Bluetooth connection controlled 
the robot, a Meccanoid G15 KS. A Motorola Moto G 4G 
controlled the movements. The operator produced the 
robot's speech using a modified voice. The voice was 
designed using the Pixie voice module on Voxal from NCH 
Software. A hidden control camera was used to ensure 
correct control of movements and responses in the Wizard 
of Oz paradigm [5], [63]. 
 
Fig. 1. Experimental setting. 
D. Eriksen Flanker Task 
Each session (session 1 and 2) consisted of 220 trials, 
i.e. 110 congruent (55 “<<<<<”, and 55” >>>>>”) and 110 
incongruent (55 “<<><<”, and 55 “>><>>”) trials. The 
Flanker interference was computed by subtracting the 
response times (RT) of congruent trials from the RTs of 
incongruent trials (in ms). The higher the score, the less 
efficient selective attention performance was. 
Before the experimental trials in the first session, the 
participants responded to 20 samples to enable them to learn 
the response keys (“##<##”, “##>##”).  
E. Anthropomorphic inferences.  
At the end of the experiment, the participants completed 
the Robotic Social Attribute Scale [30]. This scale makes it 
possible to evaluate robots on the dimensions of warmth 
(e.g. “emotional”), competence (e.g. “interactive”) and 
discomfort (i.e. “I find this robot scary”). This scale has 
been standardized to measure the social perception of robots 
based on their appearance. For each dimension, the 
participants had to indicate whether they thought the 
different characteristics fitted the presented robot (from 1 
“does not fit at all” to 5 “totally fits”). 
The participants also completed the humanness scale 
based on Haslam’s dehumanization taxonomy [20], which 
consists of four dimensions: human uniqueness (e.g., moral 
sensibility), animalistic dehumanization (e.g., irrationality), 
human nature (e.g., interpersonal warmth), and mechanistic 
dehumanization (e.g., inertness). Once again, for each 
dimension, the participants rated (on a scale of 1 to 5) 
whether or not they would attribute the related 
characteristics to the robot that was present with them. For a 
similar use of these questionnaires, see [5]. 
We presented the scale at the end of the study to avoid 
any priming effect due to questionnaires. However, the 
anthropomorphic inferences in conditions with and without 
robot interaction had been evaluated in a pre-test, see [6]. 
IV. RESULTS 
A. Preliminary analyses.  
The data from three participants were excluded from the 
analysis because of technical problems (i.e., robot 
disconnection, program crash). In addition, the data from 
participants with an accuracy rate less than 70% were 
discarded because we could not be sure that they performed 
the task conscientiously (7 participants). The results 
obtained from the remaining participants are summarized in 
Table 1. Errors occurred on 8.83% of the trials and were 
analyzed independently. Correct trials with reaction times 
(RT) more than 2.5 standard deviations above or below the 
mean in each condition and for each participant were 
considered outliers and removed from the RT analyses. 
These amounted to 771 out of 26,805 trials (2.87% of the 
trials). This filtering procedure has the advantage of 
excluding extreme values without specifically affecting the 
data of any one condition or any one participant (raw data 
are available on OSF). The analyses were conducted using 
SPSS 24 and the mediation analyses using the PROCESS 
plug-in. 
B. Control session.  
To ensure that all the groups were comparable, we 
conducted two repeated-measures ANOVAs, on both errors 
and RTs in Session 1, including the type of stimulus 
(congruent vs. incongruent) as within factor and the 
experimental condition as between factor. Results showed 
no significant interaction between experimental condition 
and type of stimulus on either errors, F(2, 67) = 1.25, p = 
.293, η²p = .04 or RTs, F(2, 67) = .021, p = .979, η²p < .01. 
However, the participants were more accurate on congruent 
trials than incongruent trails, F(1, 67) = 41.84, p < .001, η²p 
= .38, 95%CI [.07; .14]; and responses on congruent trials 
were faster than on incongruent trials, F(1, 67) = 71.82, p < 
.001, η²p = .52, 95%CI [68.99; 111.49]. 
C. Experimental session. 
We again conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on 
Session 2 errors and RTs, including the type of stimulus 
(congruent vs. incongruent) as within factor, and 
experimental conditions as between factor. Results showed 
no interaction effect on errors between the type of stimulus 
and the experimental condition, F(2, 67) = 1.65, p = .201, 
η²p = .05. However, the main effect of the type of stimulus 
was significant, F(1, 67) = 54.70, p < .001, η²p = .45, 
95%CI [.07; .12]. The same effect was present on RTs, F(1, 
67) = 219.05, p < .001, η²p = .77, 95%CI [60.10; 78.84]. 
Interestingly, we found a type of stimulus by experimental 
condition interaction on RTs, F(2, 67) = 3.82, p = .027, η²p 
= .10, 95%CI [.07; .12] (Figure 2). To test our hypothesis, 
we conducted a planned comparison analysis. This type of 
analysis reduces the risk of making a Type II error. Results 
showed that there was no significant difference between the 
alone and the non-social robot experimental conditions, 
t(67) = .39, p = .697, η²p < .01, while the participants in the 
social robot condition achieved higher selective attention 
performances than the average of those in the other two 
conditions, t(67) = 2.74, p = .008, η²p = .14. This confirms 
our Robot SFI effect hypothesis. The main effect of group 
on RTs (without taking account of the type of stimulus) was 
not significant, F(2, 67) =.24, p = .789, η²p = .01. 
 
Fig. 1. Eriksen Flanker interference (RTs on congruent trials minus 
RTs on incongruent trials) as a function of the experimental session (Alone, 
Non-Social Robot, Social Robot): the less positive the value, the better the 
selective attention performance. Error bars represent 1 standard error. 
D. Anthropomorphic and humanization attributions. 
If we consider the experimental conditions (social vs. 
non-social), a MANOVA including the anthropomorphism 
(i.e., warmth, α = .82; competence, α = .88; discomfort, α = 
.77) and humanization (i.e., human uniqueness, α = .88; 
animal dehumanization, α = .60; human nature, α = .77; 
mechanistic dehumanization, α = .67) attribution scores 
showed that the participants in the social robot condition 
perceived the robot as having more uniquely human traits 
(e.g. maturity, logic), F(1,44) = 4.33, p = .043, η²p  = .09, 
95%CI [.04; 2.29], traits relating to human nature (e.g. 
cognitive openness), F(1,44) = 6.70, p = .013, η²p  = .13, 
TABLE I.  MEAN CORRECT RESPONSE TIMES (IN MILLISECONDS), STANDARD ERRORS (IN PARENTHESES) AND ERROR RATES AS A FUNCTION OF THE 
TYPE OF STIMULUS, FLANKER SESSION, AND EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
    Alone Non-social robot Social robot 
    Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2 
Congruent 
RT 246.61 (13.21) 220.36 (12.14) 275.72 (13.21) 229.22 (14.96) 247.72 (13.80) 231.72 (12.69) 
ER .95 (.01) .97 (.01) .96 (.01) .98 (.01) .95 (.01) .95 (.01) 
Incongruent 
RT 351.86 (22.57) 296.83 (14.96) 368.05 (22.57) 310.11 (14.96) 338.85 (23.57) 287.76 (15.62) 
ER .87 (.03) .91 (.02) .87 (.01) .88 (.02) .81 (.03) .83 (.02) 
Flanker 
Interference 
RT 105.25 (18.17) 76.47 (8.01) 92.34 (18.17) 80.98 (8.01) 91.13 (18.98) 51.04 (8.37) 
Results 
p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 
 η²
p = .26  η²p = .58  η²p = .28  η²p = .60  η²p = .26  η²p = .36 
ER .08 (.03) .06 (.02) .10 (.03) .10 (.02) .14 (.03) .12 (.02) 
Results 
p = .007 p = .004 p = .001 p < .001 p < .001 p < .001 
 η²
p = .11  η²p = .12  η²p = .16  η²p = .23  η²p = .26  η²p = .30 
 
95%CI [.28; 2.24], and warmth traits (e.g. happiness), 
F(1,44) = 4.33, p = .012, η²p  = .13, 95%CI [.27; 2.12] than 
those in the non-social robot condition. This finding 
validates our second hypothesis about the impact of social 
interaction on robot perception. 
 
1) Human uniqueness 
We conducted a first mediation analysis including 
experimental conditions (IV), human uniqueness attribution 
(mediator) and selective attention performance in the second 
session (DV) in a model, R
2
 = .39, F(2, 43) = 13.46, p 
<.001. Results showed that the participants attributed more 
human uniqueness traits to the robots in the social than in 
the non-social condition, (a1) t(44) = 2.08, p = .043, 95%CI 
[.036; 2.29]. When the effect of human uniqueness 
attribution on selective attention performance was controlled 
for, (b1) t(44) = -4.39, p <.001,  95%CI [-18.64; -6.91], the 
direct effect of experimental conditions on selective 
attention performance, (c) t(44) = -2.33, p = .025, 95%CI [-
55.72; -3.98], became non-significant, (c’) t(44) = -1.33, p 
=.192,  95%CI [-37.80; 7.80]. This suggests that mediation 
took place. In sum, in the social robot condition, participants 
attributed more human uniqueness traits to the robot than 
they did in the non-social robot condition. After the social 
interaction, the more uniquely human characteristics they 
perceived the robot as possessing, the greater the 
performance improvement generated by the presence of the 
robot was, b = -.33, 95%CI [-.64; -.01] (Figure 3). 
 
Fig. 3. Mediation of the robot presence effect on standard selective 
attention performance by human uniqueness inferences. 
 
2) Human nature 
The second mediation analysis differs only in that 
human nature attribution replaces human uniqueness 
attribution as a mediator in the model, R
2
 = .30, F(2, 43) = 
9.33, p <.001. In confirmation of our hypothesis, the 
analysis showed that the participants attributed more human 
nature traits to the robot in the social HRI condition, (a1) 
t(44) = 2.59, p = .013, 95%CI [.28; 2.24]. When the effect of 
human nature attribution on selective attention performance, 
(b1) t(44) = -12.29, p = .001,  95%CI [-19.47; -5.11], was 
controlled for, the direct effect of experimental condition on 
selective attention performance, (c) t(44) = -2.33, p = .025, 
95%CI [-55.72; -3.98], became non-significant, (c’) t(44) = 
-1.17, p =.250,  95%CI [-39.24; 10.50], thus suggesting that 
mediation occurred. Once again, the participants in the 
social robot condition attributed more human uniqueness 
traits to the robot than those in the non-social robot 
condition. After the social interaction, the more human 
nature traits (e.g. cognitive openness) they perceived the 
robot as possessing, the greater the performance 
improvement brought about by the presence of the robot, b 
= -.34, 95%CI [-.69; -.08] (figure 4). 
 
Fig. 4. Mediation of the robot presence effect on standard selective 
attention performance by human nature inferences. 
 
3) Warmth 
The final analysis introduced the warmth dimension as a 
mediator in the model, R
2
 = .19, F(2, 43) = 5.11, p <.01. As 
shown by the ANOVA, the participants attributed more 
warmth traits to the robot after the social HRI than after the 
non-social HRI, (a1) t(44) = 2.61, p = .012, 95%CI [.27; 
2.12]. When the effect of warmth attribution on selective 
attention performance, (b1) t(44) = -2.10, p <.041,  95%CI 
[-16.78; -.33] was controlled for, the direct effect of the 
experimental conditions on selective attention performance, 
(c) t(44) = -2.33, p = .025, 95%CI [-55.72; -3.98], became 
non-significant, (c’) t(44) = -1.48, p =.147,  95%CI [-46.43; 
7.17], thus suggesting that mediation occurred. In sum, the 
participants in the social robot condition attributed more 
human uniqueness traits to the robot than those in the non-
social robot condition. After the social interaction, the more 
uniquely human characteristics they perceived the robot as 
possessing, the greater the performance improvement 
generated by the presence of the robot, b = -.22, 95%CI [-
.50; -.01] (figure 4). 
 
Fig. 4. Mediation of the robot presence effect on standard selective 
attention performance by warmth inferences. 
 
4) The best predictor of performance improvement 
We conducted a regression analysis on selective 
attention performance in the second session, including the 
scores on the 3 anthropomorphism dimensions and the 4 
humanization dimensions. This analysis makes it possible to 
evaluate the unitary effect of each variable, while 
controlling for collinearity, in order to extract the best 
predictor. When all the other dimensions were controlled 
for, the results showed that only the attribution of human 
uniqueness traits had a significant predictive effect on 
selective attention performance, b = -.63, t(45) = -2.80, p = 
.008, η²p  = .17, 95%CI [-25.29; -4.07]. The more uniquely 
human traits the participants considered the robot to possess, 
the better they performed in the second session. We also 
found a statistical trend toward a significant effect of 
discomfort attribution: the more the participants described 
the robot as being characterized by discomfort traits (e.g. 
awkward), the lower the interference due to incongruence in 
the Flanker task was in the second session, b = -.25, t(45) = 
-1.75, p = .089, η²p  = .07, 95%CI [-23.75; 1.75]. 
These results were confirmed by the mediation 
comparison analysis, including all dimensions as 
independent mediators in a global mediation model, R
2
 = 
.47, F(2, 43) = 4.17, p <.01. Again, only mediation by 
human uniqueness was significant, b = -37, 95%CI [-.50; -
.01], thereby validating the third hypothesis concerning the 
modulation of the robot-human conceptual distance as a 
mediator of SFI effects. 
V. DISCUSSION 
In the future, robots may be more present in the 
everyday human environment. It seems crucial to 
understand, today, how their presence may impact human 
cognitive processes. The aim of this study was to evaluate 
the role of the perception of robots in social presence effects 
on human cognitive performances resulting from the passive 
presence of a robot. 
First, we demonstrated that social interaction changed 
how participants considered the robot in terms of human 
uniqueness (e.g., cognitive openness), human nature and 
warmth traits compared to a simple visual description. This 
result confirmed that the nature of the HRI influences 
humans' representations of the robot in whose presence they 
are [64]. It is important to note that social interaction only 
boosted positive attributions (i.e., more human uniqueness, 
human nature, warmth traits), while negative attributions 
(i.e., animal dehumanization, mechanistic dehumanization, 
discomfort traits) remained stable.  
These results could point to two phenomena. First, negative 
attribution does not change because, unlike humans, robots 
seem to be considered as objects. Unlike a human being that 
can be dehumanized, a robot cannot be de-
anthropomorphized. One can only assign new human 
constructs [65]–[67] or social traits [30] to the robot, as if 
this social agent were a "blank page". However, it seems 
likely that this process only applies to new HRI. In the same 
way as for humans, it is be possible that once a robot has 
been anthropomorphized, subsequent HRI might modulate 
these inferences. However, the question of whether long-
term HRI might increase, stabilize or reduce this type of 
anthropomorphism process remains unclear [68]. 
Second, these anthropomorphic inferences only occur in 
specific contexts that require such inferences to be made. 
The scientific literature shows that there are automatic 
neuro-socio-cognitive perceptual processes, such as face 
recognition (automatically activated during simple 
perception, even with non-humans) [69], [70]. In the case of 
HRI, it seems likely that the perception of and interaction 
with robots are based on such processes. However, this 
“hijacking” of these human-human interactions, together 
with the automatic neuro-social processes they involve and 
which result from the social evolution of our species, is not 
enough to cause the attribution of social constructs [44]. In 
other words, the strength of bottom-up inputs is not enough 
in itself. To create anthropomorphic inferences, it is 
necessary for the context to reinforce these bottom-up inputs 
through top-down processes activated by the context (e.g., 
the type of HRI, the robot’s behavior). For example, in both 
experimental conditions in this study, the robot was 
perceived in the same way before the interaction. The robot 
was not seen as more “mechanical” in one condition than in 
the other as a function of the stability of the negative 
attributions. In other words, the robot started with a certain 
quantity of mechanical (e.g., superficial) and animal (e.g., 
amoral) traits and this quantity remained stable, even after 
the experimental induction. However, we suggest that the 
activation of social scripts during the social interaction 
would have led to the attribution of a more anthropomorphic 
perception of the robot [7], [13], [71]. The reason could be 
that when we interact with creatures (even non-humans), 
processes (e.g. mentalization) occur that allow us to attribute 
intentionality and mental activity to the other in order to 
understand and predict their behavior [44], [72].  
We found the same effect for the "warmth" dimension of the 
"warmth and competence" dyad, which are considered to be 
universal dimensions of social perception [19]. This result is 
interesting in that it suggests that when people 
spontaneously interpret their impressions of others, these 
two dimensions account for almost all of the variance (≈ 
82%) [73]–[75].  Given the universal qualities of the warmth 
and competence dimensions, it might be asked why we 
found no such results for competence attribution. Warmth 
judgments are primary, that is to say they are made before 
competence judgments. Warmth also carries more weight in 
affective and behavioral reactions. This also accounts for 
traits relating to de-humanization dimensions. For example, 
the attribution of morality traits from the human uniqueness 
dimension (which is strongly correlated with the warmth 
dimension) determines approach-avoidance tendencies that 
require each to evaluate the other (i.e., positively or 
negatively) [76]. This information is more cognitively 
accessible and more predictive. Competence is related more 
to the modulation of impression (e.g. how positive or how 
negative). The fact that the HRI induction in our experiment 
lasted only 3 minutes suggests that the participants might 
have gained only a general impression of the robot. Further 
research should focus on the evolution of these attributes in 
long-term HRI in comparison to human-human interaction. 
Furthermore, according to our results, anthropomorphic 
attributions seem to mediate the effect of the presence of a 
social robot on selective attention performance 
improvement. Again, these results are in line with research 
on robots [43], intentional stance perception (i.e., the 
attribution of mental properties) [77], and the mentalization 
process (i.e., attribution of mental activity) [72]. In our 
experiment, after the social HRI, the robot could have been 
perceived by the participants as more conscious and similar 
to a fellow creature, thus resulting in a social presence effect 
[14]. Indeed, anthropomorphic inferences are needed if the 
improvement in performance is to occur in the presence of 
the robot. Importantly, the passive presence of the non-
social robot during the Flanker task in the second session 
did not influence performance compared to the control 
“alone” condition. Taken together, these findings run 
counter to a purely mechanistic, non-social approach that 
reduces the effects caused by the presence of humanoid 
robots on attention to the action of physical distraction or 
interference. Indeed, with regard to the role of top-down 
inferences, anthropomorphism is at the center of the robot 
SFI processes when mechanistic distraction is controlled for. 
There is evidence that when a focal task demands attentional 
resources, perceptual (non-social) sources of distraction can 
induce a conflict between the need to pay attention to the 
focal task (i.e., the central stimulus in the Flanker task) and 
the interfering cues (i.e., the peripheral stimuli). This 
conflict may result in cognitive overload and, ultimately, 
restrict the use of the available cues (e.g., [9]). This 
restriction directs the available attentional resources towards 
the task that is to be performed at the expense of peripheral 
cues (e.g. by focusing more exclusively on the central 
stimulus than on peripheral interfering cues). According to 
this view, however, both experimental conditions should 
have elicited the same effects, which was not the case, even 
though the robot behaved in a similar way during the task. 
Considering the mediating role of anthropomorphic 
inferences, we can reasonably assume that the effects of 
social robot presence on attention were indeed social in 
nature and cannot be trivialized or reduced to the action of 
any other nonsocial sources of distraction. 
Finally, some limits have to be addressed. First, we 
specifically chose a mechanical humanoid robot in order to 
control for anthropomorphic bottom-up inferences. It is 
therefore not yet possible to conclude that top-down 
reinforcement is necessary for all situations and for all types 
of robots. It is possible that a sufficiently human-like robot, 
with fluid movements, could stimulate anthropomorphic 
inferences on the basis of perceptual stimuli alone [55] at 
the condition to avoid the "uncanny valley" phenomenon 
(i.e., the theory that the more similar an android robot is to a 
human being, the more monstrous its imperfections seem to 
the human observer)  [55], [78]–[80]. The more human-like 
a robot is, the less interaction should be needed to stimulate 
anthropomorphism and thus social presence effects [10], 
[26]. The relative compatibility between the advanced 
technological shape and the level of perceived capacities of 
a robot could also play an important role [42]. Second, the 
social presence effect may have a negative impact on 
cognitive performances (i.e., social inhibition) when the 
amount of attentional resources needed to complete the task 
and the amount of attentional resources allocated to the 
other being present exceed an individual's reserve of 
cognitive resources [9]. To fully assess whether the social 
presence effect with robots is similar to that observed in the 
presence of humans, the same paradigm should be 
implemented with a complex task. 
In conclusion, the fact that the presence of social robots 
can impact processes as fundamental as selective attention 
provides another reason to pay particular attention to the 
psychological, sociological, and philosophical impact of 
human-robot interactions. 
OPEN PRACTICES 
All data are publicly available via the Open Science 
Framework and can be accessed at https://osf.io/kfvd8/ 
REFERENCES 
[1] R. A. Brooks, “Flesh and machines. How robots will change us.,” 
Nelson, pp. 1–5, 2002. 
[2] R. H. Paul, D. J. Libon, and R. A. Cohen, “O T O Y P O O T,” 
Human-Computer Interact., vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 204–209, 2004. 
[3] N. Riether, F. Hegel, B. Wrede, and G. Horstmann, “Social 
facilitation with social robots?,” in Proceedings of the seventh annual 
ACM/IEEE international conference on Human-Robot Interaction - 
HRI ’12, 2012, p. 41. 
[4] J. S. Herberg, S. Feller, I. Yengin, and M. Saerbeck, “Robot 
watchfulness hinders learning performance,” in Proceedings - IEEE 
International Workshop on Robot and Human Interactive 
Communication, 2015, vol. 2015–Novem, pp. 153–160. 
[5] N. Spatola et al., “Not as bad as it seems: When the presence of a 
threatening humanoid robot improves human performance,” Sci. 
Robot., vol. 3, no. 21, p. eaat5843, 2018. 
[6] N. Spatola et al., “Improved Cognitive Control in Presence of 
Anthropomorphized Robots,” Int. J. Soc. Robot., 2019. 
[7] C. Edwards, A. Edwards, P. R. Spence, and D. Westerman, “Initial 
Interaction Expectations with Robots: Testing the Human-To-Human 
Interaction Script,” Commun. Stud., vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 227–238, 2016. 
[8] R. B. Zajonc, “Social facilitation,” Science (80-. )., vol. 149, no. 3681, 
pp. 269–274, 1965. 
[9] R. S. Baron, “Distraction-conflict theory: Progress and problems,” 
Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol., vol. 19, no. C, pp. 1–40, 1986. 
[10] C. Nass and Y. Moon, “Machines and mindlessness: Social responses 
to computers,” J. Soc. Issues, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 81–103, 2000. 
[11] M. W. Baldwin, “Relational schemas and the processing of social 
information,” Psychol. Bull., vol. 112, no. 3, pp. 461–484, 1992. 
[12] C. L. Stevenson, P. J. Krantz, and L. E. McClannahan, “Social 
interaction skills for children with autism: A script-fading procedure 
for nonreaders,” Behav. Interv., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1–20, 2000. 
[13] C. D. Martin, The Media Equation: How People Treat Computers, 
Television and New Media Like Real People and Places [Book 
Review], vol. 34, no. 3. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1997. 
[14] P. Huguet, M. P. Galvaing, J. M. Monteil, and F. Dumas, “Social 
presence effects in the Stroop task: Further evidence for an attentional 
view of social facilitation,” J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., vol. 77, no. 5, pp. 
1011–1024, 1999. 
[15] M. Augustinova and L. Ferrand, “The influence of mere social 
presence on Stroop interference: New evidence from the semantically-
based Stroop task,” J. Exp. Soc. Psychol., vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 1213–
1216, 2012. 
[16] S. Lemaignan, J. Fink, and P. Dillenbourg, “The dynamics of 
anthropomorphism in robotics,” Proc. 2014 ACM/IEEE Int. Conf. 
Human-robot Interact. - HRI ’14, pp. 226–227, 2014. 
[17] J. Suls, R. Martin, and L. Wheeler, “Social comparison: Why, with 
whom, and with what effect?,” Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci., vol. 11, no. 5, 
pp. 159–163, 2002. 
[18] B. Scassellati, J. Kennedy, T. Belpaeme, A. Ramachandran, and F. 
Tanaka, “Social robots for education: A review,” Sci. Robot., vol. 3, 
no. 21, p. eaat5954, 2018. 
[19] S. T. Fiske, A. J. C. Cuddy, and P. Glick, “Universal dimensions of 
social cognition: warmth and competence,” Trends Cogn. Sci., vol. 
11, no. 2, pp. 77–83, 2007. 
[20] N. Haslam, “Dehumanization: An integrative review,” Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, vol. 10, no. 3. pp. 252–264, 2006. 
[21] B. A. Eriksen and C. W. Eriksen, “Effects of noise letters upon the 
identification of a target letter in a nonsearch task,” Percept. 
Psychophys., vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 143–149, 1974. 
[22] G. Dreisbach and S. Böttcher, “How the social-evaluative context 
modulates processes of cognitive control,” Psychol. Res., vol. 75, no. 
2, pp. 143–151, 2011. 
[23] S. Atmaca, N. Sebanz, and G. Knoblich, “The joint flanker effect: 
Sharing tasks with real and imagined co-actors,” Exp. Brain Res., vol. 
211, no. 3–4, pp. 371–385, 2011. 
[24] C. D. Martin, “The Media Equation: How People Treat Computers, 
Television and New Media Like Real People and Places [Book 
Review],” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 34, no. 3. pp. 9–10, 1997. 
[25] I. Kollar, F. Fischer, and F. W. Hesse, “Collaboration scripts - A 
conceptual analysis,” Educ. Psychol. Rev., vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 159–
185, 2006. 
[26] E.-L. Sallnäs, K. Rassmus-Gröhn, and C. Sjöström, Supporting 
presence in collaborative environments by haptic force feedback, vol. 
7, no. 4. 2002. 
[27] C. Breazeal, “Social interactions in HRI: The robot view,” IEEE 
Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Part C Appl. Rev., vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 181–
186, 2004. 
[28] K. Tanaka, H. Nakanishi, and H. Ishiguro, “Comparing Video, 
Avatar, and Robot Mediated Communication: Pros and Cons of 
Embodiment,” in Collaboration Technologies and Social Computing, 
2014, vol. 460, pp. 96–110. 
[29] T. Chaminade, J. Hodgins, and M. Kawato, “Anthropomorphism 
influences perception of computer-animated characters’ actions,” Soc. 
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci., vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 206–216, 2007. 
[30] C. M. Carpinella, A. B. Wyman, M. A. Perez, and S. J. Stroessner, 
“The Robotic Social Attributes Scale (RoSAS),” in Proceedings of 
the 2017 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot 
Interaction - HRI ’17, 2017, pp. 254–262. 
[31] N. Spatola et al., “National stereotypes and robots’ perception: the 
‘made in’ effect,” Front. Robot. AI, 2019. 
[32] S. T. Fiske, “Stereotype Content: Warmth and Competence Endure,” 
Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci., 2018. 
[33] J.-C. Croizet, J.-P. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt, and G. Schadron, 
“Stereotypes and Social Cognition.,” Contemp. Sociol., vol. 25, no. 3, 
p. 402, 2006. 
[34] N. Haslam and S. Loughnan, “Dehumanization and 
Infrahumanization,” 2014. 
[35] C. H. Dupree and S. T. Fiske, “Universal dimensions of social 
signals: Warmth and competence,” in Social Signal Processing, 2017, 
pp. 23–33. 
[36] D. Kuchenbrandt, F. Eyssel, S. Bobinger, and M. Neufeld, “When a 
Robot’s Group Membership Matters: Anthropomorphization of 
Robots as a Function of Social Categorization,” Int. J. Soc. Robot., 
vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 409–417, 2013. 
[37] J. Shi, Y. Kashima, S. Loughnan, C. Suitner, and N. Haslam, 
“Subhuman, Inhuman, and Superhuman: Contrasting Humans with 
Nonhumans in Three Cultures,” Soc. Cogn., vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 248–
258, 2008. 
[38] J.-P. Leyens, S. Demoulin, R. Gaunt, M. P. Paladino, and J. Vaes, 
“Infra-humanization: The Wall of Group Differences,” Soc. Issues 
Policy Rev., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 139–172, 2010. 
[39] S. T. Fiske, “Attention and weight in person perception: The impact 
of negative and extreme behavior,” Soc. Cogn. Sel. Work. Susan Fisk., 
vol. 82, no. 6, pp. 15–40, 2018. 
[40] L. T. Harris, S. M. McClure, W. Van Den Bos, J. D. Cohen, and S. T. 
Fiske, “Regions of the MPFC differentially tuned to social and 
nonsocial affective evaluation,” Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci., vol. 
7, no. 4, pp. 309–316, 2007. 
[41] E. Oztop, T. Chaminade, and D. W. Franklin, “Human-humanoid 
interaction: is a humanoid robot perceived as a human?,” IEEE/RAS 
Int. Conf. Humanoid Robot., vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 830–841, 2004. 
[42] T. Chaminade, D. W. Franklin, E. Oztop, and G. Cheng, “Motor 
interference between humans and humanoid robots: Effect of 
biological and artificial motion,” in Proceedings of 2005 4th IEEE 
International Conference on Development and Learning, 2005, vol. 
2005, pp. 96–101. 
[43] T. Chaminade et al., “Brain response to a humanoid robot in areas 
implicated in the perception of human emotional gestures,” PLoS 
One, vol. 5, no. 7, 2010. 
[44] T. Chaminade et al., “How do we think machines think? An fMRI 
study of alleged competition with an artificial intelligence,” Front. 
Hum. Neurosci., vol. 6, 2012. 
[45] G. Rizzolatti, “The mirror neuron system and its function in humans,” 
in Anatomy and Embryology, 2005, vol. 210, no. 5–6, pp. 419–421. 
[46] K. L. Bunday, R. N. Lemon, J. M. Kilner, M. Davare, and G. A. 
Orban, “Grasp-specific motor resonance is influenced by the visibility 
of the observed actor,” Cortex, 2016. 
[47] V. Gallese and A. Goldman, “Mirror neurons and the simulation 
theory of mind-reading,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 2, no. 12. 
pp. 493–501, 1998. 
[48] R. A. Zwaan and L. J. Taylor, “Seeing, acting, understanding: Motor 
resonance in language comprehension,” J. Exp. Psychol. Gen., vol. 
135, no. 1, pp. 1–11, 2006. 
[49] A. P. Saygin, “Point-Light Biological Motion Perception Activates 
Human Premotor Cortex,” J. Neurosci., vol. 24, no. 27, pp. 6181–
6188, 2004. 
[50] M. E. W. Varnum, C. Blais, and G. A. Brewer, “Social class affects 
Mu-suppression during action observation,” Soc. Neurosci., 2016. 
[51] E. Cracco, L. De Coster, M. Andres, and M. Brass, “Mirroring 
multiple agents: Motor resonance during action observation is 
modulated by the number of agents,” Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci., 
2016. 
[52] S. M. Aglioti, P. Cesari, M. Romani, and C. Urgesi, “Action 
anticipation and motor resonance in elite basketball players,” Nat. 
Neurosci., vol. 11, no. 9, pp. 1109–1116, 2008. 
[53] N. Epley, A. Waytz, and J. T. Cacioppo, “On Seeing Human: A 
Three-Factor Theory of Anthropomorphism,” Psychol. Rev., vol. 114, 
no. 4, pp. 864–886, 2007. 
[54] A. Wykowska, T. Chaminade, and G. Cheng, “Embodied artificial 
agents for understanding human social cognition,” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2016. 
[55] A. P. Saygin, T. Chaminade, H. Ishiguro, J. Driver, and C. Frith, “The 
thing that should not be: Predictive coding and the uncanny valley in 
perceiving human and humanoid robot actions,” Soc. Cogn. Affect. 
Neurosci., vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 413–422, 2012. 
[56] M. Salem, F. Eyssel, K. Rohlfing, S. Kopp, and F. Joublin, “To Err is 
Human(-like): Effects of Robot Gesture on Perceived 
Anthropomorphism and Likability,” Int. J. Soc. Robot., vol. 5, no. 3, 
pp. 313–323, 2013. 
[57] A. M. Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al., “Neural correlates of empathy 
towards robots,” in ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-
Robot Interaction, 2013, pp. 215–216. 
[58] L. D. Riek, T.-C. Rabinowitch, B. Chakrabarti, and P. Robinson, 
“How anthropomorphism affects empathy toward robots,” in 
Proceedings of the 4th ACM/IEEE international conference on 
Human robot interaction - HRI ’09, 2009, p. 245. 
[59] J. Mulholland, Review: The Media Equation: How People Treat 
Computers, Television and New Media like Real People and Places, 
vol. 113, no. 1. 2018. 
[60] F. Eyssel and D. Kuchenbrandt, “Manipulating anthropomorphic 
inferences about NAO: The role of situational and dispositional 
aspects of effectance motivation,” in Proceedings - IEEE 
International Workshop on Robot and Human Interactive 
Communication, 2011, pp. 467–472. 
[61] C. R. Wilson Van Voorhis and B. L. Morgan, “Understanding Power 
and Rules of Thumb for Determining Sample Sizes,” Tutor. Quant. 
Methods Psychol., vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 43–50, 2007. 
[62] F. Faul, E. Erdfelder, A. G. Lang, and A. Buchner, “G*Power 3: A 
flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, 
and biomedical sciences,” Behav. Res. Methods, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 
175–191, 2007. 
[63] B. Hanington and B. Martin, Universal methods of design: 100 ways 
to research complex problems, develop innovative ideas, and design 
effective solutions, vol. 49, no. 10. Rockport Publishers, 2012. 
[64] F. Hegel, S. Krach, T. Kircher, B. Wrede, and G. Sagerer, 
“Understanding social robots: A user study on anthropomorphism,” in 
Proceedings of the 17th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and 
Human Interactive Communication, RO-MAN, 2008, pp. 574–579. 
[65] B. Tay, Y. Jung, and T. Park, “When stereotypes meet robots: The 
double-edge sword of robot gender and personality in human-robot 
interaction,” Comput. Human Behav., vol. 38, pp. 75–84, 2014. 
[66] F. Eyssel and F. Hegel, “(S)he’s Got the Look: Gender Stereotyping 
of Robots,” J. Appl. Soc. Psychol., vol. 42, no. 9, pp. 2213–2230, 
2012. 
[67] F. Eyssel and D. Kuchenbrandt, “Social categorization of social 
robots: Anthropomorphism as a function of robot group membership,” 
Br. J. Soc. Psychol., vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 724–731, 2012. 
[68] J. M. K. Westlund, H. W. Park, R. Williams, and C. Breazeal, 
“Measuring young children’s long-term relationships with social 
robots,” in Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Interaction 
Design and Children  - IDC ’18, 2018, pp. 207–218. 
[69] D. S. Berry and J. L. Finch Wero, “Accuracy in Face Perception: A 
View from Ecological Psychology,” J. Pers., vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 497–
520, 1993. 
[70] A. Stigliani, K. Grill-Spector, V. S. Natu, K. S. Weiner, and J. 
Gomez, “The functional neuroanatomy of face perception: from brain 
measurements to deep neural networks,” Interface Focus, vol. 8, no. 
4, p. 20180013, 2018. 
[71] F. Van Overwalle, “Social cognition and the brain: A meta-analysis,” 
Human Brain Mapping, vol. 30, no. 3. pp. 829–858, 2009. 
[72] E. Koh, Affect regulation, mentalization, and the development of the 
self, vol. 38, no. 1–2. New York, NY: Other Press, 2004. 
[73] B. Wojciszke, R. Bazinska, and M. Jaworski, “On the dominance of 
moral categories in impression formation,” Personal. Soc. Psychol. 
Bull., vol. 24, no. 12, pp. 1251–1263, 1998. 
[74] B. Wojciszke, “Morality and competence in person- and self-
perception,” Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol., vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 155–188, 
2005. 
[75] B. Wojciszke, “Affective concomitants of information on morality 
and competence,” Eur. Psychol., vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 60–70, 2005. 
[76] J. T. Cacioppo, W. L. Gardner, and G. G. Berntson, “Beyond bipolar 
conceptualizations and measures: The case of attitudes and evaluative 
space,” Personal. Soc. Psychol. Rev., vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 3–25, 1997. 
[77] S. Gupta, “Intentional Systems,” Corp. Capital. Polit. Philos., vol. 68, 
no. 4, pp. 52–62, 2017. 
[78] J. Seyama and R. S. Nagayama, “The uncanny valley: Effect of 
realism on the impression of artificial human faces,” Presence 
Teleoperators Virtual Environ., vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 337–351, 2007. 
[79] K. F. MacDorman and H. Ishiguro, “The uncanny advantage of using 
androids in cognitive and social science research,” Interact. Stud., vol. 
7, no. 3, pp. 297–337, 2006. 
[80] M. Mori, K. F. MacDorman, and N. Kageki, “The uncanny valley,” 
IEEE Robot. Autom. Mag., vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 98–100, 2012. 
 
